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IN 'rHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia· 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2220 
WILLIAM P. CARROLL, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
ANNIE MILLER, Defendant in Error. 
PETI'l'ION F'OR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of .Appeals 
of Virginia: · 
Your petitioner respectfully shows unto yottr Honors that 
he is aggrieved by a judgment entered on the second day of 
June, 1939, by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, in favor of Annie Miller against your petitioner for 
the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00), 
with interest and costs. The transcript of the record, to-
gether with the original exhibits in the case, are herewith 
p,resented. 
The petition is adopted as the opening brief, and a copy 
was delivered to counsel for Annie Miller on the 6th day of 
September, 1939. 
Oral argument of this petition is requested. 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
FACTS. 
This is an action brought by notice of motion for judgment, 
· in which damages were sought for injuries alleged to 
2• have been sustained by Annie *Miller in an automobile 
accident which occurred in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
on October 27, 1938. At the time of the accident Miss Miller 
was riding in the automobile as a guest, William Carroll driv-
ing, and there being no other persons in the car. 
From the evidence it appears that Mr. Carroll and Miss 
Miller had been friends for a number of years, and Miss 
Miller had ridden with Mr. Carroll on numerous occasions. 
On this particular evening Mr. Carroll called at Miss Miller's 
home, and the two of them went out to Miss Thompson's · 
home on North Shore Road. There they met with several 
other young pepole and they left the Thompson home just a 
little after midnight. There was no other car in the imme-
diate vicinity at the time, the weather was clear and the road-
way dry. The car operated by Mr. Carroll was a 1936 Ford, 
two-door sedan, which had been purchased by Mr. Carroll 
as a used -car a couple of weeks before this accident hap-
pened. Mr. Carroll had been driving cars about six years, 
and he was familiar with this partic:ular location through 
which they were driving at the time. 
The car was proceeding in a westerly direction towards 
Hampton Boulevard on ,North Shore Road. :North Shore 
Road at this point is quite narrow, there being twenty _feet 
between the curbs, and with a very· low curbing, being only 
a four-inch curb at the side (R., p. 44). The roadway at 
this point has a curve in it, though it is not a sharp curve, 
·and the whole situation is accurately shown by a plat which 
was introduced in evidence. and which is marked as defend-
ant's exhibit No. 1. · 
The speed of the car was estimated at 35 miles an hour 
(R., p. 35). Upon approaching the residence known as the 
Eg·gleston home Carroll stated that his right front tire gave 
way (R., pp. 33 and 34), as a consequence of. which the 
3* car *jerked to the right, went over the very low curbing, 
struck a tree in the sidewalk . a glancing blow, and then 
struck a second tree with the front of the car. As a result 
of this impact :Miss Miller was thrown into the windshield 
and sustained injuries especially about her face. No difficulty 
had been experienced in steering the car before this time, 
and the tire showing what was claimed to be a blowout was 
also introduced in evidence. As a result of the car taking 
this sudden swerve and running over the low curbstone and 
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s.triking the :first tree a glancing blow, Carroll lost control of 
the car so that it struck the second tree (R., p. 41). 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence motion was made by 
counsel for the defendant to strike the evidence upon the 
ground that the testimony showed Miss Miller to be riding 
in the car at the time of the accident as a guest and that .the 
facts as developed did not as a matter of law constitute gross 
negligence. This motion was overruled, to which counsel ex-
cepted, and at the conclusion of all of the evidence the mo-
tion was renewed upon the ground that the evidence as a 
whole did not sustain the charge of gross negligence. The 
motion was again overruled and exception noted. Various 
instructions were then offered, some of which were refusecl, 
and the matter was allowed to go to the jury with the_ re-
sult that a verdict was returned for the plaintiff in the sum, 
of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00). A 
motion to set aside this verdict was made and fully argued, 
which motion was likewise overruled by the court and judg-
ment entered for the plaintiff, to which action counsel again 
excepted. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ~RROR. 
1. The court erred in refusing to sustain the motions by de-: 
fendant to strike the evidence. 
4* ""2. The court erred in granting plaintiff's instruction~ 
1 and 2. . 
3. The court erred in refusing to grant" defendant's in-
structions R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4 and R-5. · . 
4. The court erred in overruling the motion bv defendant 
to set aside the verdict in this case and to enter up judgment 
for the defendant or to grant it a new trial. 
5. The court ~rred in not·holding as a matter of law that 
the evidence failed to show gross negligence upon the part of 
the defendant. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. The Evidence in This Case Does Not Sustain the Charge 
of Gross Negligence. · 
The evidence in this case is quite brief, and the facts are 
few and contain no conflict. The plaintiff herself makes no 
charge of any particular act of negligence, and we read her 
testimony in· vain for any criticism of the driving of the car 
by her companion Carroll. Although these two had been 
driving for about half a mile from the home of their host. 
4 
there is no word iii _the testhnoiiy jjf fast or reckless drivlnga 
and this record is singularly free ffoin the elements that. arEl 
so ofteh found h1 these cases of any condition of the driver 
which might un:&t. liim foi qfiving or cause him to be carelesEt 
in driving. Dtii'iiig the peri9d pi·ecedirtg the accident no com-
ment had been m~de by plaintiff upon the matmer of dfrv.: 
ihg; and, in fact, thei-e is rte intifiiatie~ whatev_et; in the ree-
ord that there. ,vas any catise fof it. To say; therefore1 that 
the defeilclaiit is liable in this ease is to fasten upoti him 
5• a liability *that should hot belong even up6ii the tlieoty 
of sitttple rteglig·ence; for it is a catdiiial principle that 
the mete happening of an acei(\~nt does not prove negligence 
or give right to a recovei'y: The sh~iigest statement made 
by Miss MµIer appeai's at page 8 of the 1·ecord; hi which she 
states; "Well, We Were dfrvhig pn Noi-th Shohi: Bouleya~d 
at just a co_nsiderable speed; and it seemed to me he suddenly 
was going faster. I don't knchv ,vhy, but he was. • • • I say 
that it seerti~d that suddenly we were going a little faster; 
and I looked up and I saw the eurve that goes more sharply 
than the one we bad been on, and I said something to the 
effect, 'Look out, Billy'. At that tii;ne I heard the tire scream 
sort of, and then it erashed' '~ A11d on page 15, '' I don't re-
member any particular sharp movement. We did not make 
the turn; tl.iat is the ,My if seemed to me. " • • I say the way 
it seemed to me we were tfyihg t6 get around the curve and 
j11st did not get atotihd it'': The exclamatich1, "Look out, 
Billy", was made at a time so close to the accident that it 
was too late to dd anyt4ing if anything coul~lhave beeh don~ 
(R., p. 16). The screec}iiiig of the tire to which she 1·efertecl 
was '' just the usual 11ois~ that. a t!te makes when , it goes 
around a curve'' (R, p. 18)~ She did not hear any blowout 
by the tire, nor did sh~ kriQW WJ:!ether she was thrown for-
ward into the dttshboMd when the car sideswiped the first 
tree or second ttetl (R.; p. 9). . . 
Miss Miller was followed by her father, J. G. Millei·, who 
knew nothing· whatever ~b~ut Jhe facts (?f the accident, but 
he testified that on the night of the accident while at the hos-
pital he had a talk with William Carroll, at which. Carroll 
stated: ''Well; at the hospital that night I asked him abbut 
it and be told me about 35 miles aii hour" (R., p. 27). 
This is the testi~ony upon the part of the plaintiff to 
6" sustain a •charge of gross negligence, and one may read 
the record in vaiii for iiny testimony from any wit_ness 
on behalf of the plaintiff usingJiJiy strong~r term~ than thosA 
above quoted; It is ttl be noted tha~ Miss Miller _d¢es n_ot stty 
that Carroll ,vas speeaint or .that he was. driving Jn her 
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simply going along· "at just. a mmsiderable speed'';. The enlt 
reas6ii given f 01~ the accident is the opinion expressed by het 
at paga 15 that ''we were trying to get around tlie eutve aml just didn't get around it''. . .• 
Ori behalf t,f the defendant the able witness to the accident 
was :Mr; Carroll himself~ He testi.fies ptactically to the samt:! 
thing that Miss Miller testified to; that they ;had been to ~all 
upon the Thofupsonst who live about a half mila from thij 
place of this accident; that he was driving this used car whicli 
he had purchased two weeks bef ote; that he was familiar witli 
the roadway; and that there was no indication of any troliblij 
whatever until this occurrence. At page B3 he says i 
'' A. I was driving through here:..;._and the road goes en 
back. that way (pointing);....;.;.;! Mn1e around here; and I judge 
right along here somewhere my right frcrnt tire gave away. 
I went up o~ th~ curbstone heie and hit this tr¢e; scraped 
this tree on the side, and hit this one directly iii front of the 
car --the second tree. '' 
W4en the front tire gave away "it j<frked to tlie right'' (R;• 
p. 34). ~t page 35 he says: '' I estimate my speed ab,otit 85 
miles an hour,'' and a~knowledged th.at iii talking with Mi\ 
Millet about the &c.cide1it_he told him that 11¢ thohkht he w~s 
going abdut 35 miles an hour (R., p. 35). He tlid n(lf. re~all 
Miss Miller sa1ing anything t(> him jlist as the accident 0¢1. 
curred (R.1 p. 36). His headlight!3 were bhrning. and his 
brakes w~te in good order. On cross examination he stat~d 
. that lie did not recall heating the tire bldw oµt (R., p~ 
7* QJ), biit he could stell by the a~tion of the cflr (R., p~ BS)~ 
. Upon suggestion mad~ by counsel fof plaintiff the. tire 
f:r;~ni the rfght front ,vheel wa~ btt>ught into &otitt ~nd ex~ 
hibited. to the jury. ·when the car hit the tree Catroll 's chin 
wjls eut and his leg was skinned tip a little (R; p; 40) .. Also, 
-w4en h_e struck the first tt-ee he lost control of his car (R., 11.~ 
41). On_ re-eross examination ,vhen at.torney for plaihti~ 
attemptetl to enlarge upon this rate of sp~ed Mt. Carroll 
stated positively that_ that was his best esti;.qate as to liis 
m_axi;mum speed,~that he might have betm going slower tliaft 
35 J~., p. 42). _ . 
This compfises the evidence for tne def eiitlaiit on tlie 
<tuesHpn tlf negligence, and we again submit that thEh-e is not 
~ne ~t o{ testiih<?ny upon. which gross neg~igence . ca~ . be 
predicated, or which would justify tlie court iii submitting 
the _matter to the jui.·y. 
The notice of motion ftH· jrtdgmeiit in this case alleges that. 
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the defendant ''operated and ran said automobile with gross 
negligence so as to cause said automobile to run off of. the 
driveway of the street upon and over the curbstone and mto 
and against two trees" (R., p. 1). When the guest doctrine 
was established in tl}is State by the case of Bogg_s v. Plybot1, 
157 Va. 30, 160 S. E. 77, the matter was thoroughly reviewed 
as to the difference .between gross negligence and· ordinary 
negligence, and -it was there pointed out that the negligence 
necessary to sustain a verdict was such as w~s culpable and 
in which the driver was guilty of knowingly or wantonly op-
erating the car. The Legislature of Virginia in 1938 adopted 
this principle in an Act, which is Section 2154(232) of our 
Code, and which fixes the measure of negligence which will 
justify a recovery·as ''gross negligence or willful and wanton 
disregard of the safety of the person or property of the per-
son being so transported''. 
s• *Since the Boggs and Plybon .case our appellate court 
has had before it many guest eases involving different 
facts and extending and illustrating the principle as origi-
nally laid down. It is submitted that the language of the 
statute does not alter the principle announced by the appel-
late court. It also seems clear to us from a reading of these 
many decisions that there has been drawn a very clear line 
dividing the cases of ordinary or simple negligence from those 
which involve such a combination of reckless acts as to justify 
the holding that it constituted gross negligence. 
The main point urged in the present case both in the argu-
ments on the various motions and in the argument before the 
jury was that relating to speed, counsel for plaintiff contend-
ing that_ the operatio:p of a motor car at the rate of 35 miles 
an hour was such a reckless disregard of the safety of Miss 
Miller as to amount to negligence of the grossest kind. It is 
true that evidently feeling that such a charge under the cir-
cumstances was particularly weak, he further urged that the 
defendant was also negligent in not keeping a proper lookout, 
which, coupled with his so-called excessive speed, combined 
to bring the case within the rules as laid down by this Hon-
orable Court. But naturally, the first question we would ask 
in connection with this alleged failure to observe is just what 
was he supposed to be looking out for. There was no traffic 
· .on the road to interfere with the operation of the car, he 
was thoroughly familiar with this particular location, and 
th~refore well ~cquainted with t~e details of driving at this 
pomt. . ~o that m the final analysis we c<?me down to t~e legal 
proposition of whether so-called excessive speed of itself is 
sufficient to establish gross negligence. And in discussing 
William P. Carroll v. Annie Miller. 7 
this phase of the matter it must be remembered that we _ 
9* strenuously contend that there *was no excessive speecJ.; 
that the plaintiff herself had no criticism to make about-
it, and that the highest estimate given by the defendant was 
a rate of 35 miles. When we consider the speed of the cars 
involved in other cases which have been before _this court, the 
rate of speed which Mr. Carroll was making appears insignifi-
cant. Therefore in the discussion of this question· may we 
point out that as a matter of fact the excessive speed ·upon 
which the point is based does not exist. 
This court has definitely stated that speed alone without 
evidence of other serious acts of negligence was insufficient 
to justify the holding· of gross negligence.- One of the lead-
ing cases in Virginia involving this particular point is that 
of Young v. Dyf:.:r, 161 Va. 434, 170 S. E. 737, and in view of 
the statements of Chief Justice Campbell in that opinion it 
is difficult to justify the holding of Judge Spindle, sitting for 
Judge Han ck el in the Circuit Court of the City of ,Norfolk, 
in the present case. In the Young and Dyer case the auto-
mo bile was being driven at a speed of fifty miles an hour 
along an unfamiliar portion of curved highway, and the driver 
had not observed any warning signs as he approached the 
curve where the accident occurred. The guest in the car had 
called the driver's attention to the fact that she was making 
fifty miles an hour and also pointed out the curves, as she 
was afraid the driver didn't see them. Where the accident 
happened the curve was evidently sharper than either the 
driver or guest expected, and as a result the car skidded and 
overturned, · and the guest was injured and recovered a ver-
dict in the lower court, which verdict on motion was set aside 
by the presiding Judge. The third syllabus of the opinion is 
as follows: . . 
10* ., 'One driving automobile at 50 miles per hour along 
unfamiliar portion of curving highway held not guilty 
.of gross negligenc~, rendering her liable for injuries to guest 
when car overturned at sharp curve, in absence of circum-
stances indicating_ that curve could not be safely negotiated 
. at such speed, or vehement protests by guest." 
And the fourth syllabus dealing with the driver ·s failure 
to pay attention is as follows : 
'' Automobile driver's lack of attention and diligence or 
mere inadvertence does not amount to wanton or reckless 
conduct or constitute gross negligence rendering her liable· 
for injuries to guest.'' · 
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Concluding the discussion in the opinion is a paragraph 
which has been copied in a good many opinions since, and is 
an apt illustration of a clear statement of the law as ap-
plicable to such a situation. We copy it from page 739 as 
follows: 
'' A mere failure to skillfully operate an automobile under 
all conditions, or to be alert and observant, and to act intel-
ligently and operate an automobile at a low rate of speed 
may, or may not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have done under the circumstances, and 
thus amount to lack of ordinary care; but such lack of at-
tention and diligence, or mere inadvertence, does not amount 
to wanton or reckless conduct, or constitute culpable negli-
gence for which defendant would be responsible to an in-
vited guest. 
'' In our opinion, the instant case is ruled by the decision 
of Boggs v. Plybon, supra, which has been reaffirmed by this 
court in the recent case of Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 
S. E. 63. '' 
It would seem difficult t.o find a case which would be more 
applicable to the present situation than this Young and Dyer 
case. And wl1en we consider the fact that in the Young case 
Mrs. Dyer was driving· at a much greater speed without know-
ing the cbaracter and nature of the roadway and had been 
going around curves, it will be seen that the acts of the driver 
in the present case were indeed mild in comparison. 
11 * "This court has considered the guest doctrine in so 
many cases that it is impossible within the limits of a 
reasonable brief to discuss them all. It does appear to us, 
however, to be definitely established that where a mere ques-
tion of speed is concerned that alone is not sufficient to war-
rant a finding of g-ross negligence and that it is only when 
coupled with other acts of negligence, the combination of 
which may bring· about an accident, that it is considered in 
this aspect. We ref er to the leading Virginia cases in whic~ 
speed was involved, and which we contend uphold this view 
and reaffirm Justice Campbell's decision in the Young and 
Dyer case. 
In the case of Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S. E. 332, the 
car was being driven around a curve at a speed from 45 to 50 
mileEJ an hour. The door of the car came open, allowing the 
guest to fall out and injure herself. In commenting upon 
the mere question of speed the court refers to the decsiion 
in Young v. Dyer, with the following approving language: 
William P. Carroll v. Annie Miller. 
"In that case (Young v. Dyer, sitpra) the defendant's car 
left the road and turned over as the result of being driven 
around the curve at an excessive rate of speed, yet this court 
held that that did not constitute such gross negligence as 
would make a host liable to his guest.'' 
In the case of Stubbs v. Parker, 169 Va. 676, 192 S. E. 820, 
there was a judgment for the defendant in the lower court 
which was reversed and remanded. It there appears, how-
ever, that the speed of the car was around 55 miles or 65 miles 
an hour; that the guest had protested, but that the driver did 
nothing to check his speed, and the car finally collided with 
a tree with such force that the body of the car was cut in half, 
and it then skidded on its side 90 feet with half of the hous-
ing and the right rear wheel some 125 feet from the car. The 
driver himself admitted that he was driving too fast, the 
opinion stating as follows: 
12* *"We have mentioned the shortness of the distance 
traveled that night ·by the defendant and the decedent 
from the Paul house to the point of the catastrophe. We 
have stressed the speed which was developed by the Ford 
V-8. We have noted the remonstrance of the girl. All of 
this, tog·ether with the nearly complete demolition of the car, 
some of its important parts thrown 125 feet away, the car 
itself or what remained of it, skidding on its side 90 feet dis-
tant from the tree it had struck obliquely, tells the story of an 
utter disregard of the safety and well-being of the defenElant 
and his trusting companion. The admissions of the def end-
a.nt that he was driving too fast, that he was going entirely 
too fast, are more significant to our minds than the effort 
to estimate his rate of speed by numbers of miles in periods 
of time. · 
"The former shows that the young man was conscious of· 
the fact that he was driving hazardously and recklessly, 
though we· do not, of course, mean to suggest that it was in-
tentional. The exuberance of youth is a beautiful thing un-
der a wholesome degree of restraint, but let loose and un-
bounded it not infrequently leaves death in its wake.,, 
In Watson v. Coles, 170 Va. 141, 195 S. E. 506, the speed 
of the car played an important point. As to the facts, we 
quote from the opinion at page 507 as follows: 
''Instead pf going home, the car was driven first on a state 
highway or boulevard towards Suffolk, and thence' on a much 
narrower paved road. The latter road was rough and had 
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many curves. Two state traffic police officers observed the 
high speed of the car on the boulevard, and one of them in 
a police car undertook to catch up with it to warn of its 
speed. This officer says as he pursued it, it was running 
between 65 and 70 miles an hour on the boulevard, and that 
after it got on the narrower road and was going around the 
curve upon which the accident happened, it was running from 
60 to 70 miles an hour.'' 
At. the trial the defendant admitted running at a rate which 
''he realized was reckless and really too fast on that road 
and vicinity because of its ·rough condition and curves". 
Another case in the same volume is Hackley v. Robey, 170 
Va. 55, 195 S. E. 689, in which two young men had driven out 
of Richmond to a tavern where they had some beer to drink, 
although there was no evidence that either of them was in-
toxicated. Later in driving· back the car failed to make 
13* the curve where the street narrows *as it approaches 
the bridge, went over an eight-inch curb, struck a lamp 
post, after which it turned over, crushing ·the top of the car, 
and finally came to a stop upright, headed in the opposite di-
rection 189 feet from the lamp post which it had hit. In co:rp.-
menting upon these facts the court said at page 691: 
"From these facts the jnry had the right, we think, to infer 
that young Hackley was driving the oar at a very high rate 
of speed; that he was not maintaining any lookout for a situa-
tion which was plainly obvious to him, if, indeed, he was not 
actually familiar therewith; and that, under the circum-
stances, this constituted gross neg·Iigence." 
These are not all of the Virginia cases in which speed was 
involved, but they are leading cases and are sufficient to 
demonstrate the point which we have made here. It will be 
noted from the quotations in each case that the speed of the 
car has been considerable, even going as high as 60 to 70 miles 
an hour under conditions very adverse, and with other cir-
cumstances attending the speed such as previous warnings 
or admissions on the part of the driver of facts from which 
gross negligence could be assumed. None of these circum-
stances exist in the present case, and in view of this Hon-
orable Court's emphatic statement in the Young and Dyer 
case so often ref erred to it would appear to us that there 
can he no question as to the correctness of this. position. 
It is needless to quote any authorities upon the right of this 
court to question such matters or to require positive proof in 
William P. Carroll v. Annie Miller. .11 
order to sustain a judgment, but in this connection we merely 
refer to the case of Margiotta v. Aycock, 162 Va. 557, 174 S. 
E. 831. 
All of the foregoing discussion is predicated upon an al-
leged excessiveness of speed, and again we desire to call the 
court's attention to the fact that not only do the facts1 
14* even admitting speed, fail to proye gross neglig·ence, 
*but the facts do not sustain the allegation ot speed. 
This, therefore, being the case, there is no evidence whatever 
in tI?-is case even of simple negligence. . 
II. The Co-urt Erred in Its Instruction -to the J1"ry Concern-
ing Contributory Negligence. 
At the request of plaintiff the court granted instruction 
marked P-2, found at page 52 of the Record, which is as fol-
lows: 
'' The court instructs the jury that there· is no. evidence iri 
this case of any contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, Annie M_iller, so contributory negligence is no de-
fense.'' 
To meet this contention the defendant offered its instruc-
tion numbered R-1, found at page 54 of the record, whi.ch i.s 
as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury that. the plaintiff cannot re-
cover in this action for any injuries or damages to which 
· her own negligence, if any, proximately contributed.'' 
The court saw fit to _grant plaintiff's instruction and re-
fused the defendant's instruction. Defendant also requested, 
in view of the plaintiff's request for the instruction.1P-2, that 
a qualification of contributory negligence be added to the 
instruction granted for plaintiff numbered P-1. · 
Defendant's contention in the case was that there was no 
evidence of unlawful speed or reckless driving, but. ft became 
apparent during the argument of the motions that plaintiff's 
counsel would argue that there was such excessive speed and 
reckless conduct upon the part of the· driver as to constitute 
gross negligence. See the discussion at page 57 of the Rec-
ord. Defendant then contended that if plaintiff's counsel 
should be allowed to argue these points, then defendant was 
entitled to an instruction with reference to contributory neg-
ligence upon the part of the plaintiff, such instruction 
15• leaving the question ""of ultimate liability for such ac-
tion with the jury to be passed upon by it after hearing 
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all of the evidence. If plaintiff's counsel were to be allowed 
to argue recklessness and gross negligence in driving, then 
defendant was entitled to argue also to the jury that if such 
negligence existed during the period of driving the half mile 
from the Thompson home to the place of accident and the 
plaintiff acquiesced in such recklessness and gross negligence 
and gave no warning· or caution at any time before the ac-
cident . occurred, that constituted contributory negligence 
upon her part; all of this of course being left for the jury 
to pass upon. However, the court saw fit to refuse defend-
ant's contention, and by giving· the instruction for plaintiff 
as it did emphasized unduly the position of plaintiff and 
certainly left an inference in the minds of the jurymen that 
here was a plaintiff who could not be charged with any neg-
ligence herself, and yet on the other hand a defenqant whose 
recklessness .caused the accident under circumstances which 
were bound to be known to the plaintiff. In other words, the 
giving of this instruction P-2 practically made the defendant 
an insurer in the eyes of the jury. 
This was error upon the part of the court prejudicial to 
the rig·hts of tl1e defendant. If the court thought that de-
fendant was not entitled to any instruction upon contribu-
tory negligence, it should have left all discussion of this sub-
ject out of its instructions and not have emphasized the point 
by the giving of instruction P-2. 
16* *III. The Coitrt Erred in Refiesin,q to Grant Defenda;nt's 
Instruction R-3, or, in the Alternative, R-4, 
and Finally .R-5. 
With all due deferen~e to the many decisions which have 
been handed down on the question of the guest doctrine, 
and the many excellent definitions and illustrations of that 
doctrine, we nowhere have found one that is as clearlv and 
forcibly written as the paragraph from the opinion of Judge 
Campbell in the Young and Dyer case, su,pra. It is difficult 
enough to differentiate in the mind of the lavman the legal 
distinctions between simple and gross negligence, and the 
trouble with most of the definitions in the opinions is that 
while they may be clear to the lawyer, they are not thoroughly 
understood by the juryman. In other words, they are too ab-
stract in their terms. This parag-raph alluded to however 
is c~uched in language that th.e ord~nary j~rym;n can a p~ 
premate and understand, and g1ves lum a guide to follow in 
hi~ deliberations wherein it becomes his dutv to fit facts to 
principle. .. 
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Instruction R-3 copiea this paragraph, prefacing it with 
a short paragraph reading as f o,Ilows: 
'' .The court instructs the jury that the term 'gross negli-
gence' means such a degree of recklessness as amounts to 
wanton and willful misconduct.'' 
An attack was made upon this instruction primarily that it 
was extending that term further than the law requires. In 
other words, that there was a difference between gross negli-
gence and wanton and willful misconduct. The language of 
the statute is '' gToss negligence or willful a-nd wanton dis-
regard of the safety of the person", etc. It is submitted that 
although the terms in this statute a.re in the disjunctive, 
17* this does not mean that the second *is any different in 
, degree from the first, but we submit is more in the na-
ture of an explanation or illustration of the degree of lia-
bility to be imposed. As an illustration of this, we refer to 
the case of Turner v. Bitchanan, 94 F. (2d) 723, an opinion 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals from the Sixth Circuit, from 
which we quote as follows: 
"In its first consideration of the statute, Oxenger v. Ward, 
256 Mich. 499, 240 N. W. 55, 57, the court, upon a considera-
tion of its purpose and meaning of the term 'g·ross negli-
gence' as it had theretofore beeu judicially defined, concluded 
that gross negligence meant 'such a degree of recklessness 
as approaches wanton and willful misconduct'. However, 
this language may suggest recog-nition of deg-rees of negli-
gence and an appraisal of conduct which approaches yet fails 
in some degree to reach wanton and willful misconduct, a re-
finement of iuterpretation noted by a dissenting Justice as 
having been urged in Lucas v. Lindner, 276 Mich. 704, 707, 
269 N. W. 611, yet it seems clear enough from the later de-
cisions of the court that the entire phrase is single in pur-
pose and import, and was intended to cpver only such acts 
as disclose a willful and wanton disregard of consequences. 
4-s was said in Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N. W. 
851, 853, 'if a defendant be guilty of more than neg·ligence, 
we pass to willfulness or wantonness, and find ourselves en-
tirely out of the field of negligence, for willfulness, wanton-
ness, recklessness 'transcends negligence-is different in 
kind', and again in Perkins v. Roberts, 272 Mich. 545, 262 N. 
W. 305, 306, 'The term '' wanton and willful misconduct'', as 
employed in the guest act, differs in kind and not merely in 
degree from ordinary, actionable negligence, for the term 
carries more than a 'vituperative epithet'.'' 
li4 Supreme Court .of Appeals of Virginia. 
. In the first case in Virginia of Boggs v. Plybon this. negli-
gence is referred to as "culpable negligence". We submit 
that the language used in the first paragraph of this instruc-
tion as quoted ~boye is correct. However, the court refused 
.the instruction, ·.whereupon Instruction R-4 was offered, the 
only differenGe between that and Instruction R-3 being that 
the phrase '' a degree of recklessness as amoimts to wanton 
and willful misconduct'' was changed to read '' a degree of 
r~cklessness as approaches wanton and willful misconduct''. 
Upon the. refusal of the instruction :R-3 attorney for the de-
fendant offered the instruction in the above language, 
18* using· the. word ''approaches'' ra.ther than *''amounts'' 
in order to make the language of the instruction coin-
cide with the first language used in the quotation from the 
above case of Tu-mer v. Buchanan. It is also submitted that 
if we are to draw such fine distinctions as to phases of neg-
_ligence, the word "approaches", it seems to us, meets the 
objection mised by counsel for the plaintiff and as sustained 
by the court. This instruction did not say that it amounted 
to wanton and willful misconduct, but was of such a degree 
- that it approached it. And if we read the decisions arig~t, 
the doctrine certainly extends this far, and even if we admit 
that there is such a wide distinction between gross negligence 
.and wanton and willful misconduct, the definitions of '' gross 
negligence'·' certainly carry us into the realm where it '' ap-
proaches '' wanton and willful misconduct. We submit, there-
fore, that again the, court was wrong in refusing Instruc-
tion R-4. 
The defendant then offei·ed as an instruction merely the 
second paragraph, which is a verbatim copy of Judge Camp-
bell's opinion. We were entitled to have the jury told the 
very things that this instruction, which is found at page 58 
of the Record, told it so as to hav:e the benefit of argument 
backed by the interpretation of the court in dealing with the 
_specific acts relied upon by plaintiff. Frankly, we have never 
quite understood the exact objection that plaintiff had to this 
instruotion, but the court refused to grant it, having in the 
meantime been presented with an instruction drafted by plain-
tiff and shown in the record as defendant's instruction No . 
. 5 (R., p. 54). If we are not allowed to follow the language 
.?f ~nu own appellate court for the purl?ose of in~tructing our 
JurieR, especrnlly when that language 1s so applicable to the 
facts as it is in the present case, then just what authority 
are we to have for our instructions? Further, we sub-
rn~ mit that the instruction No. 5 (R., p .. 54) as •granted, 
and as a~ove stated drafted by plaintiff's co~nsel, while 
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technica1Jy correct as far as it goes, does not answer the 
purpose nor present the theories of. defendant which it was 
entitled to have presented to the jury. In the first place, a 
ret1.ding of Instruction No. 5 impresses us with an abstract 
proposition of law which for its impression upon the ordinary 
jury is useless. It lacks that direct simplicity and force 
which is contained in Judge. Campbell's language, and which 
is so easily understood. Then, too, it does not call attention 
to the several allegations of fault such as were pressed in the 
preseut ca~e, and therefore does not go far enough to -fit the , 
needs of the defendant or-to give it the benefit of instruction 
to which it was entitled. 
IV. The Oourt Erred in Refusing Defendant's bistruc-
tion R-2. 
This instruction is found at page 55 of the Record, and the 
portion to which plaintiff objected is the inclusion of the 
phrase '' or willful and want9n disregard of the safety of 
the plaintiff'''. Plaintiff's theory is that gross negligence 
does not include a willful and wanton disregard of the safety 
of the guest, and that this is shown by_ the language of the 
statute itself which has been heretofore quoted. Our posi-
tion is that the gross negligence which is required to sustain · 
a verdict in a guest case does extend to willful and wanton 
disregard of the safety of the guest. The mere fact that the 
language of the statute is in the disjunctiye does not mean 
that gross negligence does not include willful .and wanton dis-
regard, but we submit that the second part of the phrase 
merely amplifies and defines the gross negligence which is re-
quired. Unless that is so, we would find a rather anoma-
20• lous situation in *dealing with this particular statute, 
and that .is that in the same sentence of the statute we 
would find two degrees of negligence for which a defendant 
would be liable; first, that it would be liable for gross negli-
gence, or, second, that it would be liable for willful and wan-
ton disregard. If it was the purpose of the law to establish 
the limit to which the facts should extend, that is g-ross neg-
ligence, what purpose could there possibly have been in also 
mentioning another degree which, if plaintiff's contention is 
right, would involve something greater than gross negligence 1 
In other words, if they h.ad no.t intended to illustrate what 
they meant by the term "gross negligence", then the use 
of the words ''willful and wanton disregard'' are nothing but 
surplusage. Having already ·fixed the limit of gross negli-
gence, it would have been very confusing and entirelv un-
necessary to establish another degree in the same phrase. 
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Nor is this situation cured by the fact that plaintiff in her 
notice of motion for judgment merely alleged gross negli-
gence upon the part of the defendant. We submit that the 
Instruction R-2 is correctly worded and that the refusal of 
the court to grant it in the form in which it was presented was 
error prejudicial to the defendant. 
After refusing Instruction R-2, the court then granted de-
fendant's Instruction No. 4 (R., p. 52), which is a copy of In-
struction R-2 with the phrase applying to willful and wanton 
disregard omitted. · 
V. The Court Erred in Refusin,q to Set .Aside the Verdict and 
Either Enter Judgment for the. Defendant or Grant 
It a New Tr·ial. 
For the reasons set forth above defendant earnestlv sub-
mits that the court erred in not setting aside the .;erdict 
21 * of the jury as being contrary ~to the law and the evi-
dence and for improper instruction by the court. From 
our viewpoint it does not appear that the evidence is suffi-
cient to sustain any charge of neglig·ence, much less gross 
negligence, irrespective of the illustrations or definitions that 
may be given of it, and that therefore the verdict should have 
• been set aside and judgwent entered finally in favor of the 
defendant. In any event, for the many errors committed by 
the Trial J udg·e as hereinabove set forth a new trial should 
have been granted to the defendant. 
CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons heretofore stated and the errors herein-
before discussed, your petitioner prays that a writ of error 
and siipersedeas be allowed ii1 this case; that the judgment 
and rulings of the trial court may be reviewed· and reversed 
and judgment entered herein by this Honorable Court for the 
defendant in accordance with the statutes in such cases made 
and provided, or that the said judgment be reversed and a 
new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM P. CARROLL, 
By HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
His Attorneys. 
22* *I, Leon T. Seawell, an attorney at law practicing in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, hereby cer-
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tify that in my opinion it i~ proper that the decisio~ in the 
above-entitled action be reviewed and reversed by-this Hon-
orable Court. 
Received Sept. 7, 1939. 
LEON T. SEAWELL, 
936 Wainwright Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
J. W. E·. 
October 3, 1939. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded · 
hy the Court. Bond $6,000. 
M. B. W. 
RECO.RD. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereofJ on the 2nd day of June, in the year 
1939. 
Be It Remembered, That heretofore, to-wit: In the Cir-
cuit Court aforesaid, on the 4th day of March, in the year 
1939, came the plaintiff, Annie Miller, and docketed her No-
t.ice of Motion for judgment against the defendant, William 
P. Carroll, in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
To William P. Carroll. 
TAKE NO.TICE, that Annie Miller, plaintiff, will on the 
4th day of March, 1939, move the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, for a judgment ag·ainst you, defendant, 
in favor of plaintiff for $15,000.0.0 damages for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 27th day of October, 1938, 
plaintiff was riding as a mere guest in an automobile then 
and there owned, operated and controlled by de:fendant, 
William P. Carroll, to-wit, on North Shore Road, in front 
of the Eggleston dwelling house; and said defendant then 
and there operated and ran said automobile with gross neg-
ligence, so as to cause said automobile to run off of the drive-
w,ay of the street, upon and over the curbstone, and into and 
18 · ~ Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
against tw.o trees; and by reason thereof, plaintiff was greatly 
and permapen~ly. injured in many parts of her person, and 
her face and head, mouth and jaw were greatly and perma-
nently disfigured, and many of her teeth, to-wi~ 
page 2 ~ fifteen, were knocked out, and she was caused to 
suffer great and permanent pain and anguish, and 
to be permanently disabled and disfigured, and put to great 
expense in attempting to be cured of said injuries, and in 
the future will be put to great expense in attempting to be 
cured of said injuries, and money has been, and will have to 
be expended for doctors', nurses, hospital and other expenses . 
.A;NNIE MILLER., 
By JAS. G. MARTIN & SON, Counsel. 
February 9th, 1939. 
The following is the Sergeant's return on the foregoing 
notice of motion : 
Not finding William P. Carroll nor any member of his 
family above the age of 16 years at his usual place of abode 
I executed the within process in the City of Norfolk, Va., 
this the 13th day of Feb., 1939, by leaving a COPY hereof 
posted at the FRONT DOOR of his place of abode. 
LEE F. LAWLER, 
Sergt. City of ~ orf olk, Va. 
By WM. CARMINE, Deputy. 
And on the same day, to-wit, in the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 4th day of March, in the year 1939 : 
Upon the motion of the plaintiff, by her attorneys, Jas. G. 
Martin & Son, it is ordered that -this notice of motion be dock-
eted. And thereupon came as well the plaintiff, by 
page 3 ~ counsel; as the defendant,.by his attorneys, Hughes, 
Little & Seawell, . and thereupon said defendant 
pleaded the general issue to which said plaintiff replied gen-
erally and issue is joined; and the further hearing is con-
tinued. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 28th day of April, -in the year 1939 : 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and there-_ 
upon came a jury, to-wit: H. J. Amos, J. 0. Brady, E. F. 
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Stallings, G. 1 R. McPherrin, J~ G. Claud, T. L. Harrell and 
F. A. Sharwell, who were sworn to well and truly try the 
issue joined, and having fully heard the evidence and argu-
ment of counsel returned their verdict in the following words 
and :figures, to-wit: "We, the Jury, find for the plaintiff in 
the amount of $4,500.00.'' And thereupon said defendant, by 
counsel, moved the Court to set aside the verdict of the jury 
and grant him a new trial on the grounds that the same is 
contrary to the law and the evidence; and the further h~aring 
of which motion is continued. 
And at the same day, to-wit, in the Circuit Court aforesaid, 
on the 2nd day of June, in the year 1939, the day and year 
first hereinabove written: 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and the mo-
tion for a new trial heretofore made herein having been fully 
heard and maturely considered by the Court is overruled. 
. Whereupon it is considered by the Court that said plaintiff 
recover against said defendaµt the sum of Forty-
page 4} five Hundred ($4,500.00) Dollars, with legal interest 
thereon from the 28th day of April, in the yeaF 
1939, till paid, together with her costs about her suit in "this 
behalf expended, to all of which said defendant, by counsel, 
duly excepted. · 
. And thereupon said defendant having signified his inten-
tion of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for a writ of error and s1tpersedeas from the foregoing 
judgment, it is ordered that execution upon said judgment 
be suspended for the period of sixty ( 60) days from the end 
of this term of the Court upon said defendant, or someone 
for him, entering into and acknowledging a proper suspend-
ing bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty of Five 
Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, with surety to be approved by 
said Clerk, and with condition according to law. 
The following· is the Certificate of Evidence signed by the 
- Judge of this Court and made a part of this record; as therein 
shown, on the 30th day of ;June, 1939. 
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NOTICE OF APP.EAL. 
To Mr. James G. Martin, 
Attorney for Annie Miller: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 30 day of June, 
1939, at 10 o'clock A. l\L, or as soon thereafter as we may 
be heard, at Courthouse, ,Norfolk, Virginia, the undersigned 
will present to Hon. R. B. Spindle, Jr., Judge of the Cor-
poration Court of the Citv of.Norfolk, Virginia, sitting for 
Hon. A. R. Haneke!, J udg"'e of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the trial of the above 
mentioned case in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia, on April 28, 1939, the stenog·raphic report of the tes-
timony and other incidents of the trial in the above case, to be 
authenticated and verified by him. 
And also the undersigned will, at the same time and place, 
request the Clerk of the said Court to make up and deliver 
to counsel a transcript of the record in the above entitled 
cause for the purpose of presenting the same with a petition 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of 
error and supersedeas therein. 
WILLIAM P. CARROLL. 
LEON T. SEA WELL, 
His· Attorney .. 
Service accepted this 27th day of June, 1939. 
JAS. G. MARTIN, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
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RECORD. 
StenogTaphic report of all the testimony, together with all 
the motions, objections and exceptions on the part of the re-
spective parties, the action of the Court in respect thereto 
all the instructions offered, amended, granted and refused' 
and the objections and exceptions thereto, and all other in~ 
cidents of the trial of the case of Annie Miller v. William P. 
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Annie M il"!Jer. 
Carroll, tried in the Circuit Court of the City of .Norfolk, 
Virginia, on April 28, 1939, before Hon. R. B. Spindle, Jr., 
- Judge of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, sitting for Hon. A. R. Hanckel, Judge of the -Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and a jury. 
Present: Mr. James G. Martin, Counsel for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Leon T. Seawell, Counsel for the defendant. 
Phlegar & Tilghman, 
Shorthand Reporters, 
Norfolk-Richmond, Va. 
page 7 } ANNIE MILLER, . 
called on her own behalf, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Your name is Miss Annie Miller, is it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you f 
A. 22. 
Q. When were you 22 7 
A. In March, the 25th. 
Q. Of this year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. 1027 Cambridge Crescent. 
Q. On the night of the 26th of October, or early morning 
just after midnight of the next day, whom were you with in 
an automobile? 
A. Mr. William Carroll. 
Q. Where had you and Mr. Carroll been? 
A. We had been calling a! Miss LeCron Thompson's. 
Q. Who else had been callmg on her at the same time you 
were there, if you remember? 
A. Mr. Baldwin and Miss Anne Jeffries and Mr. Scully 
Sargeant. · 
Q. Miss Thompson lives further out on the North 
page 8 ~ Shore Road, does she not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As you started home, whose automobile were you in 7 
A. William Carroll's. 
Q. Who was drivingf 
A. William Carroll. 
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.Annie Milkr. 
Q. You were sitting on the front seat next to him t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the gentlemen just what happened as you came on 
North Shore Road Y 
A. Well, we were driving on North Shore Road at just a 
considerable · speed, and it seemed to me he suddenly was 
going faster. I don't know why, but he was. 
Q. Repeat that, please, real loud. . 
A. I say, it seemed that suddenly we were going a little 
faster and I looked up and I saw the curve that goes more 
sharply than the one we had been on, and I said something 
to the effect, "Look out, Billie". At that time I heard the 
tires scream sort of and then it crashed. 
Q. Was there any blowout! 
, A. Not that I heard. 
Mr. Seawell: What was her answer Y 
Mr. Martin: ''Not that I heard.'' 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Do you know what your automobile struck 
page 9} then! · 
· A. A tree. 
Q. After it struck the first tree, do you know what it did T 
A. It went forward into another tree. 
Q. And then what happened to you? 
A. As far as I know, I was thrown forward into the dash-
board. Whether the whole thing happened at the first tree 
or second tree, I don't know . 
. . Q. Were you .knocked unconscious, or not T 
A. Not wholly. 
Q. Not wholly? Have you gone out with ·me and a pho-
tographer and seen pictures taken of the scene of the acci-
dent? · 
· A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Is the condition there fairly shown by the pictures 
taken? 
A. Yes, sir. · . 
- Q. I show you three pictures which I mark ''B", "C", and 
"D", and ask you if you can identify those as accurate pic-
tures ·taken of the scene f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Martin: I put thes·e three pictures in evidence. 
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Annie Mitter. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Come over here oy the jury just a minute, 
page 10 ~ please. Now, this picture marked '' 0'' shows two 
trees in the foreground here. A:re they or not 
the two trees you str1,1ek 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. First this one here and then the one next to it across 
the walkway? 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. And the picture "D" is taken a little further off, is it· 
not? 
.A. Yes. . 
-Q. Which also shows the same two treesT 
.A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And the picture '' B '' is taken still further off and 
shows a good many other things in the foreground and then 
shows the two trees over here t 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Take your seat. You were taken to the Protestant Hos-
pital, were you not? 
. · A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you su:ff er much in the hospital T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was anything the matter with your teeth or mouth at 
all before the accident? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anything occur to your hearingY 
page 11 } .A. A slight deafness in the left ear occasionally. 
Q. Have you that still 7 
A. Every now and then. 
Q. Did you have anything like that ·before the accident t 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any other car meeting you or any traffic. to 
h~rt your procedure? 
A. No. 
Q. There was nothing else on the road t 
A. The car following. 
By the Court: What? 
A. The car following. 
Q. Car f ollowingT 
A. Yes, sir, but nothing to interfere with us. 
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By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Was t)le car that was following close or not; do you 
know? 
A. Fairly close. 
Q. And do you know who was in· that carY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was in it Y 
A. Ludwell B'aldwin. 
Q. He had come from the same house that you had been 
visiting! 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 12 ~ Q. Regarding chewing and eating, how can you 
chew and eat now-is it difficult or not? 
A. It is rather difficult. I can chew but I can't bite. 
Q. You wear false teeth at the top constantly, do you not Y. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But you have no front teeth belowf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many teeth did you lose f 
A. 15. 
Q. This place where the accident happened was in the resi-
dential section of the City of Norfolk, was it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
l\fr. Martin: The witness is with you. 
CROSS EXAM]NATION. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Miss Miller, you have known Mr. Carroll, the defend-
ant here, for quite some time, have you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many years would you say Y 
A. Since we were children. I would say about, oh, 15 
years. 
. Q. You have ridden with him on numerous occa-
page 13 ~. sions? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you ever ridden with him out to the Thompson 
home before? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever ridden with him on North Shore Road be-
fore? 
A. I don't think so; not that I remember. 
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Q. But you had been out with him on numerous occasions 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then he had called on you that night and then the two 
of you went out to ::M:iss Thompson's home on North Shore 
Road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I think there were six young people altogether there f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time did you leave the Thompson hornet 
A. I would say about 12 :30 or, maybe, 12 :15. 
Q. As you proceeded, you were going west towards Hamp-
ton Boulevard, were you not? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. There was no car in front of you 7 
A. ·Not directly in front of us. 
Q. And you think that the car driven by Mr. Baldwin was 
following you 7 
page 14} A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you see that car following you 7 
A. I. don't think I looked back to see it. I knew it was 
there. 
Q. You just knew there was a car somewhere back of you f 
A. He left at the same time we did. 
Q. But there was nothing to interfere with your own driv-
ing, or the driving of Mr. Carroll, I mean? 
A. No. 
Q. How were you sitting in the car? Were you on the front 
seat? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of a car was it? 
A. A. Ford two-door sedan, I think-1936 or 1937 model. 
Q. Mr. Carroll had not had this particular car very long, 
had he? 
A. No. .. 
Q. Was this the first time you had been in it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And as you were proceeding, there was this sudden turn 
to the right, wasn't theret 
A. No-to the left. 
Q. Sudden turn to the left f Now, which way 
page 15 } did the car go f · 
A. The car went to the left. 
Q. Now, the car made some sharp movement, did it not, 
and went up and struck that first tree-sideswiped iU · 
A. Made a sharp movement 7 
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Q. I am asking you if it did Y 
A. I don't remember any particular sharp movement. We 
did not make the turn, that is the way it seemed to me. 
Mr. Martin: Just a little louder. 
· A. I say, the way it seemed to me, we were trying to get 
around the curve and just didn't get around it. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Did you feel the jar when the wheel hit the curb? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did? Was that when you said, ''Look out, Bill"! 
A. I think that was slightly before that. 
Q. How long before, would you say Y 
A. Well, a second or two. 
Q. Just a second or two T 
A. I don 1t remember just how long. 
Q. You are familiar with the Eggleston home out the~e, 
are you not! 
· A. I know where it is. 
Q. In fact, it was just in front of that home 
page 16 ~ that this accident took place, wasn't it T 
. . A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Had you gotten in front of this home when you made · 
the exclamation "Look out, Bill"! 
A. iN o, I think not. 
Q. Did he make any replyY 
A. It was too late then. 
Q. In other words, the remark was so close to the acci-
dent that it was too late to do anything; is that correct? Is 
that what you mean to imply? 
A. It probably was. I was not driving. 
Q. Now, will you look at this plat a moment? This plat 
, will be introduced in evidence. I don't presume you are very 
a~.,customed to looking at plats Y 
A. As a matter of fact, I am. . 
· Q. You are t Well, I am glad to know that. Here is this 
triangle in North Shore Road. You remember that, do you 
noU · 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And the Thompson home, as I recall, is to. the east of 
that, is it notf · 
· A. Yes, sir •. 
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Mr. Martin: Speak loud. The stenographer has to write 
it down. 
A. Yes. 
page 17 } By Mr. Seawell: · 
Q. You and Mr. Carroll were driving west, com-
-ing from down here, coming around here ; is . that correct Y 
A. Yes. · 
Q. Now, there was indicated upon this plat at the Eggles-
ton home a driveway on the western side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know which tree it was that you first struck-
the one that you sideswiped? 
A. This indicates the Eggleston home? 
Q. Yes, ma'am. 
A. There should be two trees there. 
Q. yes. well, here is one and here is another one, and 
here is another one, and so on down, together with the pole 
there. Now, which orie was it that yoil first struck, do you 
know? 
A. It was the first tree on the Eggleston lawn. I only 
see one there. 
Q. In this picture which is marked "D", that is the walk-
way going up to the Eggleston home, is it not f 
A. No, sir; that is the driveway. There is the walkway 
(pointing). . 
Q. And the tree to the east of this walkway is the one that 
was first struck, is it not? 
A. If this is east, that is the one that was struck. 
page 18 } Q. That is the driveway, isn't itY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is the tree that was the second tree you struck, 
is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is where the automobile stopped, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, it is the two trees that are on either side of the 
walkway that go up to the Eggleston home; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Martin: Mr. Seawell, your plat does not show the 
walkway, does it? 
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Mr. Seawell: No, it does not, but it comes down just the 
other side of this street. 
Mr. Martin : Just this side of the street. 
Mr. Seawell: Yes. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Have a seat, please. You say you heard a tire scrape 
or screech, or something? What did you say about hearing 
a tire make a noise? 
.A. Just the usual noise that a tire makes when it goes 
around a curve. 
Q. You mean the tire on the pavement? 
A. Yes. 
page 19 ~ Q. You say you didn't hear any blowout Y 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Of course, you would not say that the front tire did not 
blow out? 
A. If it blew out, it must have blown out after we hit the 
first tree or the curbstone, in my opinion, because I did not 
hear it. . · 
Q. But you would not say that it did not blow out T 
A. I don't suppose that I could prove that it did not. 
Q. Miss Miller, did you have any position? Do you work 
at all? 
.A. No. 
Q. You don't have any difficulty in g·etting around, do you? 
.A. No. 
Q. You go anywhere you want to go, do you not, as far as 
physical ability is concerned f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you have taken a little trip since 
this aooident, have you not? 
A. Under ·my doctor's advice. 
Q. Where did you take a trip? 
A. To .Nassau. 
Q. You went to .Nassau f There was no one else in the 
car with you, was there Y 
A. No. 
page 20 ~ Q. You were sitting on the front seat on the 
right-hand side? Show us just how you were sit-
ting, if you recall, or tell us. 
A. I was not leaning on the door, but with my arm resting 
. on the door. 
Mr. Seawell: That is all, thank you. 
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RE-DIRECT EXA.MINATJ!ON. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Miss Miller, why did you go to Nassau sometime after 
this accidenU 
A. My doctor advised me. 
By the Court: 
Q. As a result of this accident, or something else t 
A. Yes.. · 
~~~~: . 
Q. Was anything els.e wrong with you except that which 
was caused by the accident f 
A. No. 
Mr. Martin: That is all 
Mr. Seawell: No further questions .. 
page 21} Mr. Martin: Mr. Seawell, will you put the map 
in evidence f 
Mr. Seawell: I will. 
Note: The plat is marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. 1". 
page 22 } Mr. Seawell: There is one question I want to 
ask Miss Miller. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Miss Miller, about how far is it from the Thompson 
home to the point of the accident? 
A. It is a half a mile or less; probably about three-eights 
of a mile. 
Mr. Seawell: That is all. 
J. G. MILLER, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Your name is M:r. J. G. Miller, is it not t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You live in the City of Norfolk, and yon are the father 
of Miss Annie Miller, the plaintiff in this case, are you noU 
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A. Yes. . 
Q. Regarding expenses caused by this accident, I want to 
get them listed through you in as few words as is reasonable. 
Mr. Martin: . I would like to show him this to refresh his 
memory. . 
Mr. Seawell: That is all right. 
page 2~ ~ By Mr. Martin : · 
Q. Mr. Miller, to refresh your memory, I am 
handing you a letter you wrote me, that I sho_wed Mr. Sea-
well, just to make it as brief as reasonable on the expenses. 
First, take up the first. item there of the Norfolk General 
Hospital. How much is that for Miss Annie, regarding this 
aooidentY · 
A. $276.25. That includes, of course, the nurses' meals 
with the exception of one of them. · · 
Q. How many nurses did you have.for a while at the hos-
pital? 
. A. Three. , 
Q. Have you sent me checks and receipts· showing those 
itemsf · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Martin: . Shall I put them in ~vidence, M;:r. Seawell Y 
Mr. Seawell: I do not think it is necessary. . 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. And the next item f 
A. Dr. Doggett-$100. 
Q. And the next item Y 
A. Dr. Land-$48. 
Q. And the next itemf 
A. Dr. Curtis Hudgins-$20. 
page 24 } Q. Who is Dr. Hudgins 1 
A. I don't know-an osteopath or something, 
and he gave this electrical treatment for the sinus to release 
these muscles up in her face and around these dislocated 
bones, as I understand it. I don't know. 
Q. And next? 
A. The next three are the nurses. 
Q. Name them. 
A. Nell J ohnson-$105. She did not eat at the hospital. 
That is the reason her bill was higher than the others. Edith 
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Frye-$84.00. Betty S. Howell-$84.00. They all served the 
same number of days. 
Q. Was that last item $84.00T 
A. Yes. The last two items were ·$84. 
Q. They all served-what did you start to .say Y 
:A. The same length of time. They wer·e there for three 
weeks. . 
Q. But one charged more than the others because the other 
two got the hospital meals freeY 
A. Well, they di~n 't -get them free~ They were included 
in . the hospital bill. 
Q. Proceed, then; please, sir. . . . 
A. Now, the next item on here is a trip to Nassau .. 
Mr. Seawell: If your Honor please, at this point I wish 
to interpose an objection to any expenses in con-
page 25 ~ nection with the trip to Nassau, irrespective of 
whether it would be beneficial. I think there are 
a great many of us who would be benefited by a trip there. 
I submit, if your Honor please, that this is a little far re-
moved as a cure for an injury resulting from an accident in 
which the chief injury is to the lady's teeth and mouth. I 
suggest, sir, that it is irrelevant and immaterial, and I object 
to any proof with reference to the expenses of the ~rip to 
Nassau . 
. Mr .. Martin: I think it is too doubtful for me to take any 
'chances on, your Honor. I will not press it. 
By Mr. Martin: . . 
.... _Q •. ~d the next iteinf Skip ·o~er the expenses of the ~as-
sau trip. . 
A. Drugs and incidentals-that covers such thing·s there 
wlµch came from the ho·spital-$50, · approximately. 
Q. That is not to the cent! It is about $50? 
A. About $50. It might be more or less-it would not run 
any less, I know. . . 
. Q. Mr. Miller, before the accident, was there aiiy defect 
in .your daughter ~s face of any ·s·ort f · · 
A,. No, not that. I know .of. . . . . 
Q. Had she a picture taken shortly before the accident 7 
. . . A. Yes; a month or two: 
page 26 ~ Q. I show you a picture which I will mark on 
the back ''AA'' and ask yon if that is a picture 
taken of the young .lady about a month before the accident Y 
A. Yes. 
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Mr.. Martin: I wish to put it in evidenee. 
Mr. Seawell: I object, if your Honor please, it not being 
proper evidence. 
Bv Mr. Martin: 
"'Q .. Is that a £air and true representation of. the way she 
looked before the accident or not f 
:Mr. Seawell: Will vour Honor rule on that? 
The Court:: I have .. not ruled ion it yet.. 
Mr. Seawell: My friend has already put it in evidence. 
The Court: It would seem to me that where there is a 
disfigurement, a photograph. taken before the disfigurement 
ought to be relevant. The jury can see the present state of 
disfigurement, but they eannot kuow what w.as the young 
lady's condition hef ore this disfigurement. 
By the Court: 
Q. How long oofor-e this aecid-ent was this photograph 
takenf 
.A. I know it was given to her grandfather f(l)r a birthday 
present .m October., and it was takeu just bei£@re 
page 27 ~ theD.; sometime :around the :first @f Oc.tober .. 
Q .. -Of what year f 
A. L"ast year. 
Q.. The accident :happened m 1N!Ovembeir of last year f 
Mr. Martin: October 27th . 
. A. I 1thi11k .it was <B>bo~t tlire a. 7th, antl this pietu;y:,e was ,giv-en 
to him as a birthday present. 
The Co.mi.: I thlmik it is .admissi:hle. 
Mr. Seawell: Nodie my exception. 
. Mr .. Martin : I wish to put it .in eridence. 
~y Mr. Mart.in: 
Q. After the accident, did yon (01.' not ask rthe defendant 
William P. Carroll, how fast- he was going .at tbe time ·ef th~ 
ooeidentY 
A. WeU, at the hospital that mg,htt l asked him about it 
and he .told me a:beui 3i mdiles .ain ihou:r: 
~f.r. Mar.tin : Answer &is Jg01iltlema'lll. 
Mr. Seawell: No questions. 
. William P .. Carroll v •. Annie Killer. 3J 
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. (Here followed the medic.al and dentist's testimony.. See 
stipulation.) 
Mr. Martin: We rest. 
Mr. Seawell: If your Honor please, I have. a motion. 
The Court:: Gentlemen., will you step in yonr 
page 28 ~ jury room, pl~ 
Note: The jury retired from the eourtr-0om. 
Yr. Seawell: If yotll' Hoilll-0r please, I move th.at the evi- . 
dence of the plaintiff be stricken in this -ease 11!lJ>On the ground. 
that it is disclosed by this eridenee that the plaintiff was rid-
ing as a guest with the defendant in the ear a.t the tim.e ,of 
the accident. It is also in evidence that ifil.lere was 1.00 aet, 
which under the interpr.etatiiotn of the [aw a'S ex:pressed by-on.r 
own appellate te.ourt, that w0:a[d .constitute gross negligence 
or wilful and wanton conduct upon the part of thi-s defendant. 
That bemg :so., we .ar,e entitled, I ithinkJ t1:> have· the -evidence 
struck as not being· suf ficie.nt ro 'Stlstain a -eyer.diet. (The mo-
tion was further argued by eG'llllsel., 
The Court: Tl1e motion is overruled. I think the ca-se 
should go to the jury. 
Mr. Seawell: Note my iexcei,tion, if youT H,onor ~ase. 
N<Doo.: 'TJne jtury t":eta.nied fo the ,eaurtroom. 
page 29} WILLIAM P~ CA.RROLL, 
called as a witness m hls own behalf being fir.st 
duly sworn, testified as follows.: · 
Examined by Mr .. Seawel[:: 
Q. Y omr name J 
A. William Carroll. 
Q. How old are y.oo, Mr. ,caTTon·, 
A. 22 years old, sir. 
Q .. Where do you live? 
A. Lockhaven. 
Q. How long have you lived in Norfolki 
A. All my life. 
Q. Do you know Miss Annie Miller, the plaintiff m ffus 
case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(l. Hi(i)w lMlg 1iaV:e· -y;(!)'ll ·knGWn ber"I 
A. Practically all of my life. 
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Q. She was riding with you on the night of _this accident, 
was she not Y · 
A. Yes, sir. . 1 Q. This accident bccurred on what. day¥ 
A. What day T. . . 
. Q. Yes, what day of the __ mo~thY. Do you remember! 
A. I don't recall the date; noi sir~ 
Q. Last October Y 
4-- ~es; sir~ . 
page 30 ~ Q. And where had you been t . . . 
. A. We had been to Mr~ Herbert Thompson's 
house in Algonquin Park. . - . . 
.. Q. Where did Miss Miller join you, Mr. Carroll, first Y 
, A. I went by her. house about 8 o'clock and picked her up. Q. where does she live 7 
. A. Cambridge Crescent, Larchmont . 
. Q. You went to Mr. Thompson's ho:nse with her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long were you at Mr. Thompson's honseT 
. A. I would say about three hours. 
Q. And there were other young people there, were there 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And then you two started home 1 
.A. Yes, sir. . . . . 
Q. Was anyone in the car with you except ifiss Miller t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What. kind of_ car were you driving! 
A. '36· Ford, two-door .sedan. 
Q. How long had you had_. it f . . . . 
... A. I don~~ recall now whether I bought it the Sunday be~ 
fore the accident or the Sunday. before that. . 
. .. . . Q. vV:~II, . yon had had it no longer than twd 
page 31 } weeks,. anyhow! . . 
n A. About hyo we,eks, yes, sir. 
Q. Was it a new car or notf 
A. No, sir, it was a used car. 
Q. From whom did yon buy it f 
~- Hudgins-Lu~ring. _ . , 
Q. Had you owned cars before thaU 
.A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. How long have you been driving a carf 
A. I would say about six years. . . . 
Q. Now, with reference to the location of this particular 
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accident in Algonquin Park, are you or not familiar with the 
North Shore Drive? 
A. Yes, I am familiar with it. 
Q. Did you ever live out there in that neighborhood? 
A. No, sir. I lived on the other side of the street car Jine, 
the other side of Hampton Boulevard. 
Q. Had you ever driven through North Shore Road before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you driven .through there many times or a few 
times! 
A. Many times. · 
Q. Were you or not familiar with the roadway at the point 
where this accident occurred T 
page 32 ~ A. I didn't understand the question. 
Q. Were you or not familiar with the roadway 
at the point where this accident occurred! 
A. You say, was I not? 
By the Court: 
Q. Were you or were you not f 
A. I was familiar with it. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Now, in what direction·were you proceeding at the time 
of this accident? · 
A. West. 
Q. Proceeding west? I show you a plat that h.as already 
been marked in evidence and ask you to come down here be-
fore this jury. You have looked at this plat before in my 
office, have you not? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Show the jury the point from which you were coming 1 
A. )Vould it be all right if I turned it around? 
Q. You turn it any way you want. 
A. We were coming this way (pointing). 
Q. That is, you were going in a general wester.ly direc-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. You see, this points north here. 
. Q. Towards Hampton Boulevard Y 
page 33 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. I notice this triangle here at the 
intersection of North Shore Road and Diven St. Do ,ou re-
member t.haU ., 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now, to the east going back from this triangle, is that 
road straight or does it curve? 
A. No, sir, it curves. 
Q. That is going east of that triangle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell us as you were coming along there just 
what happened, Mr. CarrolH 
A. I was driving through here-and the road goes on back 
that way (pointing)-! came around here, and I judge right 
along here somewhere my right front tire gave away. I went 
up on the curbstone here and hit this tree, scraped this tree 
on the side, and hit this one directly in front of the car-the 
second tree. 
Q. The second tree, for the purpose of the record, that 
you finally hit is the one marked, and is in front of the Eg-
gleston home? 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. That roadway there is about how wide; do you remem-
ber? 
page 34 ~ A. 20 feet, I think. 
Q. "What about the curbstone on the north side 
of that street as to its height? 
A. I judge about that high (indicating). 
Q. Have yon measured it, yourself? 
A. I have been around there since the accident but I never 
have measured it. 
Q. Will you show here approximately where you were 
when you say your right front tire gave away? 
A. I judge I was about along in here somewhere. 
Q. You say your right front tire gave away 1 What was 
the effect of that? 
A. It jerked to the right. 
Q. Had you had any difficulty in steering your car before 
this time¥ 
A. No, sir, I had not noticed any. 
Q. When the car jerked to the rig·ht, what did it do Y 
A. It went over the curb and hit this tree l1ere-hit this 
tree first (pointing). 
Q. What part of your car struck that first tree, if you know? 
A. Well, I would say from the looks of the car after the 
accident that the right-hand front axle struck it. 
Q. Is there a mark or not in this tree, which was the first 
one that you struck? 
page 35 ~ A. There is a mark on the side of this one, the 
first tree. 
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Q. And then how did you strike the next tree! · 
A. The next one hit directly in the middle of the car in the 
front. 
Q. Miss Miller, I understand, was thrown into the wind-
shield? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Carroll, what about your speed as you were 
coming through that roadway! 
A. I estimate my speed about 35 miles an hour; 
Q. Have a seat there. Had you looked at the speedometer 
at all? · 
A. I had not. noticed it, no, sir. 
Q. That was just your estimate! 
A. I just estimated it, yes, sir. 
Q. When Mr. Miller asked you about it afterwards, I be-
lieve you testified you were going about 35 miles an hour 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that correcU 
A. :Y-es, sir. · 
Q. You say you were familiar wit~ that roadway! 
_t\... Yes, .sir, very familiar with it. 
page 36 } Q. ,v as there any other traffic there to interfere 
with the operation of your carT 
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. Have you driven through there a number of times be-
fore? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Miss Miller says that just as the accident was about to 
happen-. as she expressed it, . "Didn't have tiine to do any-
thing"-she said, "BiJI, look out", or words to that effect. 
Do you remember her saying anything? 
A. I don't remember her saying it. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't recall her saying anything just as the acci-
dent happened? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have your headlights burning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were your brakes in good order? 
A. Yes, sir, very good. 
Q. About what time of night was it that this accident oc-
curred¥ 
A. Well, I would say around 12 :30. We left the Thomp-
sons just a little after 12. 
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Q. :About how f~r is it from the Thompsons to the place 
of the accident 7 
page 37 ~ · A. I judge about half a mile. 
Mr. Seawell: Answer :M:r. Martin's questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
• Q. Who repaired your car f 
A. Russ Company. 
Q. Did you have any pictures taken of it? 
A. :N"o, sir. . 
Q. How much did it cost to repair it? 
A. $260. 
Q. Brakes were in fine condition, were they not? 
A. Very good. 
Q. Were the headlights burning well-strong headlights Y 
A. Yes, sir. · · · 
Q. You mean to swear to this jury you had a blowout be-
fore this car swerved! 
, A. As far as I know, I did, sir. 
Q. Did you hear it? 
A. I didn't hear the tire blow out, no, sir. 
Q. You did not hear it blow out? 
A. :N"o, sir. 
Q. Isn't that just an average thought-that you 
page 38 } think it must haye blown out to swerve you T 
A. No, sir. I could tell by the action of the car . 
. Q. The action of the car was such that yon thought yon had 
a blowout without hearing any noise? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. Where did you get your tires from? They came on the 
car, didn't theyr 
A. They were on the car when I bought it, yes, sir. 
Q. From whom did you buy it T 
A. Hudgins-Luhring. 
Q. What kind of tires were they? 
A. I think they were Goodyear. 
. Q. Where are the tires today 'I 
A. Some of them are on the car, and the one that blew out, 
I still have it. 
Q. Where is itY 
A. In my car. 
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Mr. Seawell: vVc have it, if your Honor please, if l\fr. 
Martin wishei:; to see it. 
Mr. Martin: Yes, I do. 
Bv Mr. Martin: . 
~ Q. When was that taken off-after the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Don't you know that tire was broken when.it 
page- 39 ~ hit the curbstone! Don't you know the curbstone 
broke it when you hit iU · 
A. It might have, sh. . 
Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Miller that it did 1 
A. No, sir. ~ 
Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Miller you didn't know whetheT you 
had a blowout before or after you hit the curb Y 
.A. I don't remember making any statement of that kind. 
Q. You don't remember that Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Think a minute again. Don't you remember .telling Mr. 
::M:iller you didn't know whether that tire broke before or after 
you hit the curb? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Y oil don't remember? 
.A. I don't reinember making any statement of that kind. 
Q. You don't deny it; yo.u just don't remember it? 
A. Well, I don't remember. 
Q. Why didn't you stop your car after it hit the curb Y 
A. I lost control of it. 
Q. The brakes were good, were they not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you put them on 7 
A. No, sir. 
page 40 ~ Q. You didn't put your brakes on t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You made a sideswipe on the first tree f 
A. Right. 
Q. And ran forty feet and a half and struck the second 
tree without ever putting your brakes on 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the second tree is what stopped you? 
A. ':I.1hat is right. 
Q. You never stopped, yourself, at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Martin: That is all. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMI:NATIO;N. 
Bv Mr. Seawell: 
• Q. When this happened-whatever it was that happened 
to your right front tire-and_ your wheel went over the curb 
and struck this first tree, what did it do to you, personally Y 
A. To tell you the truth, it happened so quick I don't re-
member what it did to me. 
Bv the Court : 
"'Q. Were you hurt¥ 
A. Well, when I hit the second tree I cut my chin and 
skinned my leg up a litt]e. 
page 41 ~ By :M:r. Seawell: 
Q. You say you lost control when the car 
mounted the curb and struck the first tree? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after you lost control of it, it struck the second 
tree and then stopped? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Bv the Court: 
• Q. What do you mean by '' you lost control'' f 
A. I just lost control of it. I mean by that-
Q. You mean the steering wheel was not under the control 
of your hands f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the matter with your feetf Why couldn't 
you put the brakes on f 
A. To tell you the truth, it all happened so quick I didn't 
have time to think. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Yon mean as between the first tree and the second tree Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Mr. Seawell: All right. 
page 42 ~ R~J-CR,OSS EXAl\HNATION. 
Bv Mr. Martin: 
··Q. Mr. Carroll, you said it happened so quick. Don't you 
know you were going a lot more than 35 mi1es an houri 
A. I don't know· that I wasn't. 
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Q. Would you swear you were not? 
A. I judge my speed at 35 miles an hour. 
Q. You judge it, but you were judging it in your favor, 
were you not, put.ting it down Y 
A. I don't know that I was, sir. 
Q. Would you swear you were not going more than 35 
miles an hour Y 
A. As close as I can estimate my speed, that is what I 
would estimate it at. I might have been going slower than 
35. That is just the estimate I gave, because when some-
body is driving at night, they are not looking at the speed-
ometer. 
Q. And you were not looking at the speedometer, 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Martin: That is all. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION NO. 2. 
Bv Mr. Seawell: 
.. Q. Mr. Carroll, will you step out to ·your car 
page 43} now and bring· that tire here for Mr. Martin's in-
spection Y I would like for him to see it. 
Note: The defendant at this time left the courtroom, and 
the next witness was put upon the stand in the absence of 
the defendant. 
C. R. McINTIRE, 
called as a 'Yitness on behalf of the defendant, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
E·xamined by Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Mr. McIntire, you are a Civil Engineer in the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At my requ~~t, did you make a plat of a section of 
North Shore Road 111 front of and extending along eastwardly 
from the Eg·gleston home? 
A. I did. 
Q. Is this a blueprint of the plat which yon made? 
A. A blueprint of the original, yes, sir. 
Mr. Seawell: It has already been marked in evidence, if 
your Honor please. 
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By Mr. Seawe,ll : . . . 
Q. Does this correctly portray the roadway with its dis-
tances and curvatures Y 
page 44 ~ A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. How wide is .North Shore Road between 
curbs1 
· A. .A.bout 20 feet. 
Q. Have you indicated on the plat here the height of the 
curb that is on the north side of the roadway? 
.A .• Yes, sir. It is a four-inch curb, which we have very 
few in town . 
. Q. You remark that you have very few in town. Why is 
that, sirY Why do you say that? . · 
A. Well, 90 per cent of them are six inches. 
Q. You mean to imply this was not as high as the ordinary 
curb! 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Have you at my request also marked on your plat that 
there were marks upon these two trees, the one in front of 
the Eggleston home and the one immediately east of it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,Vhere did you find the mark on this first tree Y 
A. On the .south side of it. In other words, on the side. 
towards the road, towards the curb. 
Q.- The side· towards the curb? How high above the ground 
was thatf 
.A.. A foot and four-tenths above the ground. . 
Q. Where was the mark on the tree immediately 
pgae 45 ~ in front of the Eggleston home T 
A. That was directly on the east side of the 
t.ree. 
· Q. And about how high was that? 
A. A foot and a 11alf. 
Q. I notice here that just after you pass this triangle go-
ing west you have a. tree and a pole. What kind of a pole is 
that? . 
.A. I think it is a telegraph pole; an ordinary telegraph 
pole. They are right close together, ouly three feet apart-
a little over three feet apart. 
Q. Between the pole and the tree 7 
A. Yes, sir, and about four feet ·back from the curb line. 
Mr. Seawell: All right, sir. Answer Mr. Martin. 
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CROSS EXAMINATIO~. 
Bv Mr. Martin: 
43 
., Q. Mr. McIntire, how far does this tree which shows the 
first mark sit back from the curb line-four feet and seven-
tenths! 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the second tree sits back three feet and three-
tenths from the curb line? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 46 r . :Mr. Martin : That is all. 
By the Court: 
Q. Was that drawn to _scale? 
A. Yes, sir .. One inch equals ten feet. 
Q. Is it shown on there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. I don't think yon marked it on there Y 
A. Yes-one inch equals ten feet. 
WILLIAM P. CARROLL, 
being recalled for further cross examination by the plaintiff,' 
further testified as follows: · 
Examined bv Mr. Martin: 
Q. You ha~e brought in the tire you say was on the right-
hand front wheel of your car the night of the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is the inner tube? 
A. I don't know where the tube is. · 
Q. Didn't you keep that? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Who examined it after the accident? 
A. Sir? 
Q. Who examined your car after the accident Y 
page 47 r A. It was taken to Emergency Garage that night, 
and the next day it was taken to Hudgins-Luhring 
nnd that is where thev took the tire off. 
Q. Did you take any picture of the car? 
A. No, ·sir. ( . 
Q. Did you take any picture of the inner tube? 
A. No, sir. 
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Mr. 'Martin: That is all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Mr. Carroll, did you show Mr. Martin the side of your 
tire where there was a blowout? 
Note : The witness pointed to a place on the tire. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Is that what you mean f 
A. Yes, sir. _ -
Q. That is the only defect you find in it, is it? 
A. 'l,here was a cut around the side here. The man in the 
garage said-
Mr. Seawell: Don't say what somebody told you .. 
Bv Mr. Martin: 
., Q. And you threw away the inner tube 1 
A. I didn't; I didn't throw it away, myself. It 
page 48 ~ was lost. 
Bv Mr. Seawell: 
., Q. Does this blowout place extend completely through the 
fabric of the casing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Seawell: The defendant rests. 
Mr. l\fartin: I would like to ask the defendant one more 
question, your Honor. 
WILLIAM P. CARR.OLL, 
being· recalled by the plaintiff, further testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Martin : 
Q. Mr. Carroll, you said to the jury that your ankle was 
skiuned, I think? 
A. That is right, yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't have to go to the hospital at all, did you, ex-
cept to take the young lady? · 
A. That is all. I had six stitches taken in my P-hin. 
Q. Underneath here? · 
A~ Yes, sir. 
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Q. The next day? 
A. No, sir. That was that night. 
page 49 } Q. You didn't go to bed in the hospital, did you 7 
A. No, sir. I went home. 
Mr. Martin:. That is alL 
Mr. Seawell: That is all, sir. 
J. G. MILLER, 
being recalled by the plaintiff, further testified as follows : 
Examined bv Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. !filler, something- has been said by Mr. Carroll 
about a blowout. Did vou talk to him after the accident about 
fud! • . 
A. I discussed the accident with him, or asked him about 
it, yes. 
Q. Was he or not able to tell you whether the supposed 
blowout occurred before or after he hit the curb? 
A. He didn't say when; didn't g·o into that detail. I asked 
Billie what happened and he told me he had a blowout. Of 
course, I dicln 't know whether he rolled the wheel off of 
the rim and the tire blew out or it hit the curbing, but after 
looking it over I talked to him about it and I made the asser-
tion that it probably blew out when he hit the curb. That 
was all it was to it. · 
Q. Did he deny that or not? 
. A. He didn't deny it. That was my impression 
page 50 ~ rather; no, sir. I would not say he was confused 
about it one way or the oilier, because he didn't 
s~y. 
Mr. Martin: He is with you .. 
l\fr. Seawell: That is all. 
1\f.r. Seawell: If your Honor please, I want to renew my 
· motion. 
The Court: You do not want to- a:rgue it again, do you t 
Mr. Seawell: Not necessarily. 
The Court: You can record your motion in length and I 
will overrule it. ' 
Mr. Seawe11: Note my exception. 
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page 51 ~ STIPULATION. 
It is stipulated by and between counsel for the parties that 
the following. ~om prises the testimony offered on behalf of 
the plaintiff in. support of her damages : 
1. The dentist testified, as a witness for plaintiff, that by 
reason of the accident she had lost fifteen teeth, her jaw bones 
were broken, and were not yet in apposition, she had a plate 
with some false teeth he had made, and she had suffered 
greatly. 
2. The doctors testified that plaintiff had her jaw bones 
broken by the accident, her ankle sprained, and other in-
juries. 
3. The doctors', nurses', dentist's and hospital bills were 
also · proved. 
As no point is being claimed that the damages are exces-
sive, the parties have agreed, for brevity, that. the testimony 
of the dentist and doctors need not be detailed in this record. 
I 
page 52 ~ Mr. Seawell: Defendant excepts to the grant-
ing of any instructions on behalf of the plaintiff, 
on the ground that the evidence introduced in the case fails to 
sustain the burden of proving gross negligence upon the part 
of the defendant as alleged. 
Plaintiff's Instruction P-1 (Granted): 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff, Annie ]\filler, was injured by 
gross negligence of the defendant as aileg·ed in the notice 
of motion, then it is the duty of the jury to find for the plain-
tiff.,, 
~fr. SeaweJI: Instruction No. P-1 is objected to because 
it should contain the qualification of contributory negligence 
if any, on behalf of the plaintiff. ' 
Plaintiff's lnsfructio·n. P-2 ( Granted) : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence in 
this case of any contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, Annie Miller: so contributory negligence is no de-
fense." . 
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Mr. Seawell: Instruction P-2 for the plaintiff is specifically 
objected to because it takes away from the jury, a~ a mat-
. ter of law, any consideration of contributory neg-
page 53 } ligence, if any, of the plaintiff, h~rself. This is 
especially true in view of the fact that the Court 
has refused Instruction R-1, requested by the defendant. 
PlaiJntijf's Instruction P-3 (Granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff they sliould allow her fair compensation for the in-
juries received as a result of the accident in question as ·shown 
by the evidence, including pain and suffering and incon-
venience, disfigurement, disability and expenses.' f 
Defendant's Instruction 4 (Granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that the basis of this action 
is gross negligence on the part of the defendant Carroll, and 
you cannot inf er such gro$S negligence. from the mere hap-
pening of an accident. The law imposes on the plaintiff the 
duty of proving her case by a preponderance of all the evi-
dence, and this burden rests upon her through the entire trial 
and applies at every stage thereof, and you- cannot under 
your oaths find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the 
said defendant Carroll unless and until she has proved by a 
preponderance of all the evidence that the defendant' Carroll 
was guilty of gToss negligence and that such gross negligence 
· · was the proximate cau$e of the accid~nt com-
page 54.} plained of. 
. 'f If after hearing all the evidence you are un-
. certain as to whether the defendant Carroll was guilty of 
such gross negligence as is herein described, and it appears 
equally as probable that he was not guilty as that he was, 
then the verdict must be for the defendant Carroll.'' 
Defend~nt's Instruction 5 (Granted): 
'' Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher 
in magnitude than ordinary neg·ligence. It is materially more 
want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an 
act of omissio~ respecting legal duty of an aggravated char-
aeter, as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise or-
dinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence of 
slight diligence, or the want ·of even scant care.'' · · 
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Defendant's Instruction- R-1 (Refused) : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover in this action for any injuries or damages to which h~r 
own negligence, if any, proximately contributed.'' 
Mr. Seawell: The defendant excepts to the action of the 
Court in refusing to give to the jury "R-1" requested by the 
defendant. If, as plaintiff contends, defendant was driving 
his car at a rapid rate of speed so as to be either reckless 
or unlawful, then, the duty devolved upon her to 
page 55 ~ call the driver's attention to such recklessness or 
unlawful speed, if the jury should think that such 
recklessness or unlawful speed existed. 
Defendant's Instr·uct-ion R-2 (Refused): 
''The Court instructs the jury that the basis of this action 
is gross negligence or wilful and wanton disregard of the 
safety of the plaintiff on the part of the defendant Carrpll, 
and you cannot inf er such g-ross negligence or wilful and wan-
ton disregard from the mere happening of an accident. The 
law imposes on the plaintiff the duty of proving· her case bv a 
preponderance of all the evidence, and this burden rest~ upon 
her through the entire trial and applies at every stage thereof, 
and you cannot under your oaths find a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff against the said defendant Carroll unless and until 
she has proved by a preponderance of all the evidence that 
the defendant Carroll was guilty of gToss negligence or wilful 
and wanton disregard of her safety and that such negligence 
and disregard was the proximate cause of the accident com-
p1nined of. 
'' If after hearing all the evidence you are uncertain as to 
whether the defendant Carroll was guilty of such gross neg-
ligence as is herein described, and it appears equally as prob-
able that he was not g-uilty as that he was, then the ver,dict 
must be for the defendant Carroll." 
page 56 ~ l\f r. Seawell: The defendant excepts also to the 
action Qf the Court il} refusing· to grant Instruc-
. tion R-2 asked hy the defendant, upon the ground that tlie 
phra~e "or wilful and wanton disregard of her safety" is 
& part of the duty owing by the defendant, for the breach 
of which alon~ the plaintiff c.an recover, this being a guest 
case. The language of the statute requiring '' gross negli-
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gence o~ wilful ~ud wanton di~re~ard of .t~e sa!ety of the 
guest'', 1s not meant to be applied m the d1sJunctive, but t4e 
expression "wilful and w~nton disregard" is descriptive of 
the gross negligence which is required to sustain a verdict ii). 
favor of tl1e guest plaintiff. 
D.efendant's Instruction R-3 (Refused): 
"The Court instructs the jury that the term 'gr<;>ss negli-
gence' means such a degree of recklessness as amounts to 
wanton and wilful misconduct. . 
c., The Court further instructs the jury that a mere failure 
skillfully to operate an automobile under all conditions, or 
to be alert and observant, or to act intelligently and to op-
e-rate an automobile at a low rate of speed, may or may not, 
he a failure to do what an ordinarily prudent person would 
have done under the cfrcumstances, and thus amount to lack 
of ordinary care; but such lack of attention and 
page 57 }- dilig·ence or mere inadvertence, even if you believe 
such existed, does not amount to wanton or reck-
less conduct or constitute culpable negligence for which the 
d~f end~nt would be responsible to an invited g'Uest." 
:Mr. Seawell: The defendant also excepts to the action of 
the Court in refusing to grant Instruction R-3. The phrase 
'' wanton and wilful misconduct" is a proper description of 
the amount of ,:iegligenee required in order for plaintiff guest 
to recover. 
This instruction is also particularly applicable to the pres-
ent case in that it has heen broug·ht· out in argument that 
counsel expects to argue before the jury that there was ex-
cessive speed and that t4ere was a failure upon the part 
of the defendant to be alert and observant in the operation 
of his automobile, and defendant is entitled, especially in 
view of this notiee, to have the jury told that the law upon 
the subject does not require a driver to be alert and observant, 
or operate the car at a low rate of speed, which may amol)nt 
to a lack of ordinary care, but that such must be of such a 
characte1· as to amount to culpable negligence 
page 58 ~ Defendant's lnstructio11, R-4 (Refused): 
'' 'rile Court instructs the jury that the term 'gross negli-
gence' means such a degree of recklessness as approaches 
wanton and wilful misGonduct. 
"T.he Court further irn;;tructs the jury that a mere failure 
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skillfully to operate an automobile under all conditions, or 
to be alert · ~nd observant, or to act intelligently and to op-
erate an automobile at a low rate of speed, may, or may not, 
·be a failure to do what an ordinarily prudent person would 
have· done· ~nder the circumstances, ·and thus amount to lack 
of ordinary care; but such lack of attention and diligence or 
mere inadvertence, even if yon believe such existed, does not 
amount to culpable negligence for which the defendant would 
be responsible to . the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Seawell: Def end.ant also excepts to the action of the 
Court in refusing to grant Instruction R-4, in that_ the de.;. 
scription o/ the term '' gToss negligence'' is correc.tly stated, 
and for the reasons also set forth to the action of the Court 
in refusing to grant Instruction R-3. 
, Defendant's Jnst,:uction R-5 (Refused): 
· "The Court further instructs the jury that a mere failure 
skillfully tp o.perate an automobile, or to be alert and ob-
servant, or to act intelligently and to operate an 
page 59 } at1tomobile at a low rate of speed, may, or may 
not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily prudent 
person would have done under the circumstances, and thus 
a.mount. to. lack I of ordinary care; but such lack of attention 
and diligence o:r mere inadvertence, even if you believe such 
existed, does not amount to culpable negligence for which the 
defendant would be responsible to the plaintiff.'' 
. .. 
M[9~ Seawell: Defendant also excepts to the action of the 
Court in ref using to grant Instruction R-5. This instruction 
merely· tells the ju:r;y that the conditions on such phases of 
operatio·n of an automobile, of themselves do not amount to 
culpable negligence. 
This instruction is particularly pertinent in view of the 
fact that the plaintiff's counsel has already stated th&.t h.e 
intends to argue to the jury the fact that the automobile ·was 
not operating at a low rate of speed, and that the plaintiff 
was not alert in observing, and defendant is entitled to have 
the jury told, as a matter of law, the connection of such ac-
tion with the d~gree of care which is required to sustain a 
verdict in this case. 
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pag·e 60 ~ JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, R. B. Spindle, Jr., Judge of the Corporation Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, sitting for Hon. A. R. Hanckel, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
who presided over the fore going trial of Annie Miller v. Wil-
liam P. Carroll, in the Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia, 
April 28, 1939, do certify that the foregoing is a true and 
correct copy and report of all the evidence, all of the instruc-
tions offered, amended, granted and refused by the Court, 
and all other incidents of the said trial of the said cause, with 
the objections and exceptions of the respective parties as 
therein set forth. 
As to the original exhibits introduced in evidence, as shown 
by the foregoing report, to-wit: Plaintiff's Exhibits AA, B, 
C, and D (photographs); Plaintiff's Exhibit E, ( automobile 
tire); defendant's E.xhibit 1 (blueprint), which have been 
initialed by me for the purpose of identification, including 
Etlibit E (automobile tire), it is agreed by the plaintiff and 
the defendant that they shall be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals as a part of the record in this cause in lieu 
of carrying to the court copies of said exhibits. 
And I further certify that the attorneys for the defendant 
bad reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel for the 
plaintiffs, of the time and place when the . fore-
page 61 ~ going report of the testimony, exhibits, instruc-
. tions, exceptions and other incidents of the trial 
would be tendered and presented to the undersigned for sig-
nature and authentication. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of June, 1939, within 
sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in said cause. 
R. B. SPINDLE, JR., 
Judge of the Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, sitting fot Hon. 
A. R. Haneke!, tT udge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
A copy teste : 
R. B. SPINDLE, JR., 
Judge ·as a.foreEiaid. -
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page 62 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Ciruit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virg·inia, do certify that the foreg·oing report of 
the testimony, exhibits, instructions, exceptions, and other in-
cidents of the trial in the case of Annie Miller v. William P. 
Carroll, together with the original exhibits therein referred 
to, all of which have been duly authenticated by the Judge 
of said court, were lodg·ed and fil~d with me as Clerk of the 
said Court on the 30th day of June, 1939. 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
By W. R. HA,NCKEL, D. C. 
page 63 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 30th day of June, in the year 1939. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit tCourt of the City 
of Norfolk, do certify that the foregoing· is a true transcript 
of the record in the suit of Annie Miller, plaintiff, against 
William P. Carroll, defendant, lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due no-
tice in writing thereof, and of the intention of the defendant 
to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
I do further certify that the defendant has given and filed 
in my office a suspending and sit,persedeas bond, with Ameri-
can Employers' Insurance Company, as surety in the penal 
sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, conditioned as 
required for a s~1,persedeas in section #6351 of the Code of 
Virginia. 
. Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By W. R. HANCKEL, D. C. 
Fee for Transcript $13.25. 
A Copy-T~ste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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